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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2324 
_______________ 
 
BEATRICE MARINO, Appellant  
 
v. 
 
JENNIFER VELEZ, Commissioner, 
New Jersey Department of Human Services; 
JOHN R. GUHL, Director, New Jersey Department of Human Services, 
Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-10-cv-00911) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
The case involves a dispute over the date of imposition of a penalty period for 
Medicaid benefits.  Specifically, Beatrice Marino argues that the Commissioner of the 
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New Jersey Department of Human Services and the Director of that State’s Division of 
Medical and Assistance and Health Services (the “Commissioner” and the “Director,” 
respectively) erred in calculating her assets for the purpose of determining her penalty 
period.  We disagree, and thus affirm.   
I. 
Marino has resided at Care One at King James nursing facility, located in 
Navesink, New Jersey, since April 2007.  In February 2009, she applied for Medicaid 
benefits.  Prior to applying, between November 2006 and January 2008, Marino made 
gifts to various family members totaling $192,000.  As a result, a penalty period of 26 
months and 21 days was imposed, during which time Marino, although otherwise 
eligible, could not receive benefits.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1) (imposing a penalty 
period when an applicant transfers assets for less than fair market value during the five 
years prior to the date of application).  Subsequently, Marino’s family members returned 
$89,000 to her.  As result, the penalty period was reduced to 14 months and 6 days to 
reflect the net gifted amount of $103,000.  The penalty period began to run on April 1, 
2010, the date on which Marino was determined to be Medicaid eligible (but for the 
penalty period), having spent down her returned gifts and other assets.  
On March 4, 2010, Marino filed a motion for preliminary injunction, asserting that 
the Commissioner and the Director had improperly “tolled” her penalty period.  The 
District Court denied the motion, ruling that Marino had failed to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits of her claim.  She appeals. 
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II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (interlocutory appeals as of right 
involving the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction). 
“In reviewing [a] district court’s order denying [a] motion for a preliminary 
injunction, ‘[w]e review [its] conclusions of law in plenary fashion, its findings of fact 
under a clearly erroneous standard, and its decision to grant or deny the injunction for an 
abuse of discretion.’”  New Jersey Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d 
Cir. 1994)).   
An injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be granted only in “limited 
circumstances.”  AT&T, 42 F.3d at 1426-27 (internal quotations omitted).  “In ruling on a 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must consider: ‘(1) the likelihood that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the merits at the final hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff 
is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the 
defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the 
public interest.’”  Id. at 1427 (quoting Opticians Ass’n v. Indep. Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 
191-92 (3d Cir. 1990)).   
III. 
 On appeal, Marino argues that her penalty period was improperly “tolled” from 
March through June 2009, the time after which the initial penalty period was imposed but 
during which she received the $89,000 returned to her by family members.  She asserts 
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that, because she was resource-eligible for Medicaid during those months, her penalty 
period should have begun in March 2009, ended in June 2009, and begun again in April 
2010, when she once more became resource-eligible after spending down her assets.   
  We are not persuaded.  As the District Court pointed out, in March through June 
2009, Marino received return amounts totaling $89,000, well in excess of the qualifying 
resource limit for Medicaid.  She then asked the Commissioner and the Director to 
recalculate her penalty based on the returned gifts, and thereby treat them as though they 
had remained her property.  Marino cannot now claim that she should get credit toward 
her recalculated penalty period for those months, even though she remained technically 
resource-eligible for Medicaid because she did not receive the returned funds until the 
end of June 2009.1
 Because we believe that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding 
that Marino had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, we need not reach 
her argument that she has shown a likelihood of prevailing on the remaining elements 
required for a preliminary injunction to issue.   
   
*   *   *   *   * 
 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
                                              
1 In addition, there is some doubt as to whether Marino was actually resource-eligible 
from March to June 2009.  In their brief, the Commissioner and the Director allege that, 
from 2008 to December 2009, the nursing facility was holding $7,285 in a bank account 
separate from Marino’s checking account that contained all of her other assets to be 
applied to her care as needed.  The Commissioner and the Director plan to verify this 
during discovery.  If their allegation is correct, Marino was not even technically resource-
eligible for Medicaid benefits during the disputed time period.  See N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 10:70-4.8 (stating that the qualifying resource limit for individuals is $4,000).   
